Much is at stake in Baghdad as Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi moves on November 15 toward a confrontation with the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia. The Iraqi government is preparing to assert control over Jurf al-Sakhar, a militia stronghold southwest of Baghdad, following allegations of widespread oil smuggling. What began as an investigation into illicit economic activity has rapidly become a test of whether the Iraqi state can impose its authority on one of the country’s most powerful armed factions.
The developments are potentially unprecedented. Previous Iraqi governments have often avoided direct confrontation with Kataib Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias. These groups have accumulated considerable military, political and economic power since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Many are incorporated into the state-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), while retaining separate leadership structures and political loyalties.
The immediate crisis began after Al-Hurra published an investigation on November 9 detailing alleged oil smuggling in Jurf al-Sakhar, also known as Jurf al-Nasr. The area has been controlled by Kataib Hezbollah since Iraqi forces and Shiite militias recaptured it from ISIS in 2014.
The government moved quickly. An investigative committee examined the allegations, and Zaidi subsequently dismissed several security and administrative officials in Babil Governorate. Iraqi authorities also began preparing security forces for a possible deployment into the area.
Kataib Hezbollah has rejected the allegations. According to Rudaw, the militia said a technical committee investigating the site “did not find any encroachment on oil pipelines.” It described the accusations as “fabricated claims” that “cannot withstand the truth on the ground.”
Iraqi Shi’ite Muslim men from the Iranian-backed group Kataib Hezbollah wave the party’s flags as they walk along a street painted in the colours of the Israeli flag during a parade marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, in Baghdad (credit: THAIER AL-SUDANI/REUTERS)
Iraqi security chiefs convene amid confrontation with Kataib Hezbollah
On November 15, the Iraqi News Agency (INA) reported that Lt.-Gen. Abdul Amir al-Shammari, director of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, chaired an expanded security meeting involving the army chief of staff, intelligence agencies, Federal Police commanders and senior PMF representatives.
The participation of these institutions is significant. It indicates that the government is coordinating its response across the country’s security establishment, rather than relying on a single military or police formation.
The same day, Federal Police commander Lt.-Gen. Mohammed Qasim al-Fahd inspected units of the 16th Federal Police Brigade in Jurf al-Nasr. According to INA, he emphasized “field monitoring and enhancing operational readiness” for missions in the area.
Shafaq News reported that Iraqi security officials were reviewing disciplinary measures against negligent commanders and accelerating arrest warrants. The outlet also reported that government forces were expected to enter Jurf al-Sakhar.
The government’s statements have been unusually coordinated, with messages from the Prime Minister’s Office, Security Media Cell and senior security commanders reinforcing the same themes of sovereignty, accountability and the rule of law.
“There is no place in Baghdad or any other Iraqi city for the corrupt or those who would undermine the state and its resources; we will not tolerate any violation of the law, under any pretext whatsoever,” he said, according to INA.
The dispute extends far beyond allegations of oil theft. Since taking office, Zaidi has sought to bring armed factions under state control. His government has pursued negotiations aimed at restricting weapons to official security institutions, a process that has encountered resistance from Kataib Hezbollah and other powerful factions. The government has extended its deadline for armed groups to surrender their weapons until June 2027.
Decades of Iranian-backed militia influence challenge Iraqi state authority
The challenge facing Zaidi is rooted in Iraq’s post-2003 political order. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presided over the expansion of Shiite militia influence, while the PMF gained formal recognition during Haider al-Abadi’s premiership. Subsequent governments struggled to assert effective control over factions that maintained close ties to Iran. Former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi faced threats and attacks from militias after attempting to confront them. Other leaders sought to manage the factions through political negotiations.
Zaidi’s approach appears different. His decision to remove intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri on October 27, reported by Asharq Al-Awsat, was another indication of changes within Iraq’s security establishment, although the government has not established a direct connection between that dismissal and the Jurf al-Sakhar investigation.
The current confrontation raises the question of whether Baghdad can move beyond negotiations and enforce decisions on the ground.
Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework is attempting to mediate between Zaidi and Kataib Hezbollah. According to Shafaq News, senior political figures have been discussing an arrangement under which the militia would withdraw from Jurf al-Sakhar.
On November 12, Zaidi met Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, PMF Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh and PMF Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al-Muhammadawi. INA reported that the prime minister reaffirmed his commitment to strengthening state sovereignty and the rule of law. These meetings illustrate the complicated political environment surrounding the confrontation. Several leading figures within the Coordination Framework maintain longstanding relationships with Iran and the PMF.
Iraq’s challenge to Kataib Hezbollah could threaten Iranian influence
Iran also has a major stake in the outcome. Kataib Hezbollah is among Tehran’s closest Iraqi allies, and the militia’s position within Iraq’s security and political structures has been an important component of Iranian influence. A government takeover of Jurf al-Sakhar has importance that will reverberate across Iraq. It is a shot across the bow of Kataib Hezbollah. It is calling their bluff. It could establish a precedent for asserting state authority over other militia-controlled areas.
The outcome remains uncertain. A negotiated withdrawal could allow the government to claim progress without a military confrontation. Use of force by Kataib Hezbollah, on the other hand, could expose the limits of Baghdad’s authority and create the risk of clashes between Iraqi security forces and an armed faction formally connected to the PMF. Iran could seek to intervene or profit from the crisis.
For Zaidi, the stakes are massive. His government has presented the restoration of state sovereignty as a central objective. Jurf al-Sakhar may now become the first major test of whether that objective can be translated into action.
The coming hours and days could reveal whether Iraq’s political and security establishment is prepared to support the prime minister in confronting one of the country’s most powerful Iranian-backed militias.