Citizenship before maps of separation
An-Nahar, Lebanon, October 20
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The concern expressed by the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan over the American withdrawal deserves careful consideration. It reveals that relations among the components of the Iraqi state still require guarantees from beyond its borders.
I understand the reasons for this anxiety, given a long history of repression and broken promises. But the more important question is why a country cannot reassure some of its own citizens, leaving them to seek protection from a distant power whose priorities change with its interests.
We see this in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere in our region, where national communities seek security through alliances with foreign powers. To me, this is a sign of the nation-state’s incomplete development, and one we must recognize.
Iraqi Kurds have achieved the most firmly established autonomous government among contemporary Kurdish communities. The 2005 constitution recognized the Kurdistan Region and its existing institutions, giving its people a parliament, government, and administrative structures within Iraq.
A FEMALE FIGHTER from from the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) performs a training drill during an exercise at a base near Erbil, Iraq in Feb. (credit: Stringer/Reuters)
These were substantial gains for a people who endured tragedies, including the Anfal campaign and the Halabja massacre. Yet the transition from autonomy to full independence collided with geography, economics, and the positions of neighboring countries and major powers.
In September 2017, more than 92% of participants in the region’s referendum voted for independence. The majority was overwhelming, but the desired state never materialized. Baghdad rejected the referendum, neighboring countries opposed it, and Washington withheld the support its organizers had anticipated.
The region subsequently lost control of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. The lesson is clear: popular mobilization can produce an electoral result, but it cannot overturn the balance of power or independently create the conditions for statehood.
In Syria, Kurdish forces established a de facto autonomous administration during the civil war, but it did not become a recognized independent state. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party waged a prolonged armed struggle without achieving independence. Yet Turkish Kurds cannot be reduced to that organization; many have pursued political participation and elections.
Kurdish movements themselves differ in their objectives, ranging from cultural rights and decentralization to autonomy and secession. Ignoring these distinctions distorts our understanding of diverse communities.
The issue extends far beyond the Kurds. The Middle East is crowded with national, religious, and sectarian identities, some of whose members have suffered genuine injustices. In certain cases, memories of suffering have become permanent political projects, with leaders investing in fear and presenting separation as a ready-made solution.
Regional or international powers then enter the picture, supplying weapons and promises while using these causes as bargaining chips. I believe the most dangerous illusion is that an external patron shares a community’s aspirations as deeply as its own people do. Foreign powers have their calculations; they may leave, while the community remains among its neighbors.
None of this means demanding silence from the oppressed or absolving central governments. Authorities that prohibit citizens from using their language, discriminate in employment or the courts, or bombard their cities inevitably drive people to seek alternatives.
It is easy for rulers to proclaim national unity while governing as though the state belongs exclusively to their own group. Defending national unity must therefore begin with reforming government and guaranteeing rights. Citizenship is first an obligation of the state, before it becomes a demand placed upon its people.
Switzerland offers a useful example. Four national languages and different religious and cultural traditions coexist within a federal state. French speakers were not required to abandon their language or imitate German-speaking regions. The distribution of powers, recognition of diversity, and political participation helped create a shared interest in remaining together.
Switzerland is not a model that can be copied wholesale, but it demonstrates that respecting differences can strengthen a country, and that rigid centralization is not the only path to unity.
In Canada, Quebec voters narrowly rejected sovereignty in a 1995 referendum, with 50.58% voting against it. Political disagreement continued, and separatists remained free to advocate their position without the province descending into civil war.
What matters in these examples is the existence of institutions that permit disagreement and regulate it. Citizens who can challenge authority and seek legal remedies possess alternatives to retreating into communal loyalties. A state confident in its own fairness does not interpret every demand for cultural recognition as hostility.
South Sudan offers a contrasting lesson. It gained independence in 2011, only to descend into civil war in 2013. Raising a new flag did not resolve struggles over power; divisions simply migrated inside the newly established state.
This does not erase the injustices previously suffered by southerners, but it illustrates a painful truth: a community may succeed in separating while its leaders fail to build a functioning state. The practical question therefore extends beyond drawing borders to governing responsibly, holding officials accountable, and protecting minorities within those new borders.
The struggle worth pursuing in our region is the creation of modern, just civic states that accommodate different identities without distributing rights according to them. Iraqi first, then Kurdish or Arab, Sunni or Shi’ite. Syrian first, then Kurdish, Alawite, or Druze. Lebanese first, then Christian or Muslim, Shi’ite, Sunni, or Druze.
This is about the relationship between citizens and the state, not ranking people’s worth or erasing their histories. It requires an independent judiciary, peaceful transfers of power, fair distribution of wealth, and enforceable constitutional guarantees. Without these conditions, citizenship becomes a beautiful slogan that people hear but never experience.
We need citizens to feel that their futures depend on their abilities, their security is protected by law, and their dignity requires neither a sectarian intermediary nor a foreign embassy. We also need education that teaches children about one another’s histories without accusations of betrayal or manufactured heroism.
People learn coexistence in schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, while politics destroys it by turning neighbors into suspects because of their names, religions, or languages. Nations achieve stability through justice before anything else.
– Mohammed Al Rumaihi
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and restoring the red lines
Asharq Al-Awsat, UK, October 19
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s declaration concerning Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia marks a significant development in a crisis that has expanded beyond Yemen into a regional confrontation shaped by decades of Iranian attempts to overturn the established order.
Egypt’s position should come as no surprise. As a major Arab power, it cannot abandon its responsibility to defend Arab national security and its own direct interests. Egypt and Saudi Arabia form the backbone of any firm Arab position intended to protect the region’s Arab interests.
Egypt has approached Iran’s regional expansion with considerable wisdom and patience, relying on diplomacy and time in the hope that Tehran would abandon its repeated efforts to encircle Arab decision-making centers and alter the balance of power within individual countries and across the region.
Several years ago, I met el-Sisi and asked him about Egypt, its economy, and regional security. He told me: “The forces targeting Egypt are also targeting the region. These forces of evil include extremist organizations and regional states seeking to destabilize countries and overturn existing arrangements.
“Our decision to confront these attacks and attempts is firm, and our determination is strong. As Arab countries, we must stand together to defend our national security and stability against attempts to divide our countries, plunge them into chaos, and exhaust their economies and opportunities for progress.
“I am completely confident that, together with our brothers in the Gulf and other Arab countries, we can confront those targeting our countries, our region, and our role.”
He emphasized that Egypt’s relationship with Saudi Arabia was “deep and strategic, serving both countries and Arab national security.”
“I say sincerely that our brothers in Saudi Arabia manage affairs with wisdom and firmness, and that is why I tell them we are always together.” He was equally emphatic that Saudi stability meant Egyptian stability, and vice versa.
What struck me about that interview, published in Asharq Al-Awsat, was that El-Sisi deliberately avoided naming Iran, even though Tehran was clearly among the forces he described as seeking to destabilize the region. He wanted to preserve an opening for dialogue and give diplomacy every opportunity to moderate Iranian behavior, despite Tehran’s continued violations of red lines on Arab territory.
Saudi Arabia, likewise, demonstrated considerable patience toward Iranian intrusions, keeping diplomatic channels open both before and after the Beijing agreement. Yet Riyadh remained committed to fundamental principles: respect for the red lines established by international law and those imposed by genuine good-neighborly relations.
Egyptian and Saudi policies consequently converged around supporting legitimate authorities in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen, while encouraging Iraq’s government to restore the institutions of the state and reclaim Iraq’s place within the Arab family.
During major turning points in recent decades, Egyptian and Saudi determination have repeatedly converged. They stood together when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and again when Egyptians took to the streets amid fears that Muslim Brotherhood rule threatened their country’s identity, stability, and regional role.
Saudi Arabia acted on the conviction that its own security was inseparable from Egypt’s, while Egypt understood that destabilizing Saudi Arabia would have catastrophic consequences for Egypt, the Gulf, the Arab and Islamic worlds, and the global economy.
Regional coexistence requires respect for clear boundaries: internationally recognized borders, legitimate governments, and every state’s right to choose its policies in accordance with established laws and norms. Encircling countries, penetrating their borders and security systems, and undermining their ability to make sovereign decisions are incompatible with those principles.
The Houthi organization Ansar Allah has built its approach around violating virtually every red line, domestically and internationally. Its record extends from undermining Yemen’s legitimate government and assassinating former president Ali Abdullah Saleh to holding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait hostage and carrying out the brutal bombardment of civilians at Riyadh Airport.
Iran has similarly violated red lines on other countries’ territory by establishing and arming militias, controlling their decisions, and assigning them regional missions designed to destabilize governments.
Against this backdrop, el-Sisi’s position sends a stern warning: Egypt is prepared to participate in defensive missions that help contain the region’s destabilizing forces. The combined weight of Egypt and Saudi Arabia provides a foundation for mobilizing an Arab, Islamic, and international response capable of restoring these boundaries and preventing further attempts to overturn the regional order.
The region is filled with the smell of a wider war and enveloped in uncertainty. Even the possible departure of a dangerous player named Benjamin Netanyahu would not necessarily mean a less aggressive Israel.
Nor can we predict how US President Donald Trump might respond to an electoral setback for his party in the midterms. Iran’s escalating behavior in the Strait of Hormuz could accelerate the arrival of still more dangerous confrontations. Tehran has changed neither its language nor its methods.
An Arab official smiled at length when Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that his country had tried to persuade both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis to halt their escalation, but neither side had cooperated. Araghchi was particularly careful to insist that “the Houthis make their decisions independently.” That amusing assertion only deepened the Arab official’s pessimism.
– Ghassan Charbel
Can Egypt pass the toughest test of political power?
El Watan, Egypt, October 18
In my view, the most important thing President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has said is that 2030 will mark the end of his presidency, that the decision is final and is not open to debate.
This statement deserves serious consideration, without the usual applause or the automatic skepticism that greets almost everything. If the commitment is fulfilled, its significance will extend far beyond the president himself.
Egypt has an opportunity to establish a principle essential to its future: that the end of a president’s term should be a known date for which the state prepares and about which society can feel reassured. Countries need to know how responsibility will be transferred just as much as they need to know who bears it.
I believe el-Sisi has an opportunity to shape one of the most important elements of his political legacy: leaving behind a state capable of functioning after his departure, institutions that understand their responsibilities, and a political system that produces people worthy of leadership.
But this is where our own responsibility begins. Anyone who imagines that the public’s role begins on election morning and ends with placing a ballot in the box reduces an enormous issue to a single moment.
The ballot determines the outcome, but the quality of that choice is shaped over many years. It depends on public awareness; access to information; the ability to question, compare, and hold officials accountable; and the emergence of figures whose competence has been demonstrated through actual experience.
We should not discover a presidential candidate for the first time when his photograph appears on a campaign poster. We should have seen him shoulder responsibility, explain his decisions, acknowledge mistakes, and propose solutions whose costs he understands before promising results. Egypt is too important to be entrusted to a gifted orator, a fleeting wave of popularity, or an organization that regards the presidency as a means of taking control of the state.
Egypt has institutions, and I trust that they have an essential role in protecting the country from infiltration and undue influence. But genuine protection comes through clear rules, laws applied equally to everyone, oversight of political financing and conflicts of interest, and respect for the constitution and the will of the Egyptian people.
Strong institutions reassure citizens that their country’s future is safeguarded by a system of responsibility and accountability, and that any incoming president will govern within an established framework of rules and limits.
That is why the remaining years until 2030 are just as important as the transfer of power itself. We need to see greater opportunities for qualified individuals, political parties offering practical and achievable programs, media organizations asking serious questions, and public officials judged by the results of their work.
We must also learn that political disagreement does not make someone less patriotic, just as political support does not automatically establish competence.
I see the president’s declared position as an opportunity for a major advance in Egypt’s political development. But realizing that opportunity requires preparations for the future to become visible action starting now.
If that happens, 2030 could become a defining moment: a president completing his term and handing over responsibility, a public making an informed choice, and institutions guaranteeing the continuity of the state and respect for its rules.
The greatest legacy a ruler can leave his country is a future that becomes more secure even in his absence. Egypt deserves confidence not only in whoever governs it, but also in the rules that will remain after the president leaves office.
– John Al-Masrii
Saudi Arabia and its historic role
Al Qabas, Kuwait, October 19
I lived in Saudi Arabia for more than 10 years while serving as secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council. During that time, I came to appreciate the profound and historic significance of the kingdom – not only for its people, rulers, and neighbors, but for the security and stability of the Arab and Islamic worlds and, indeed, countries far beyond the region.
Saudi Arabia, its land, and its people represent an essential pillar of stability for all who value a secure and dignified life. This is a reality recognized across continents.
The kingdom is not merely the birthplace of Islam, the home of its holiest sites, and a land central to Arab history. It is also the guardian of those sacred places, fully conscious of the immense responsibilities entrusted to it and prepared to shoulder the burdens of protecting them, maintaining their significance, and ensuring that Muslims arriving from every part of the world can worship safely and comfortably.
Fortunately, confidence among Muslims and others in the wisdom of Saudi leadership has continued to grow. The kingdom’s rulers understand that their responsibilities extend beyond the physical protection of holy sites to preserving the historical and spiritual heritage of a religion whose reach spans Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe.
What impressed me most was the Saudi state’s readiness to fulfill these obligations with extraordinary dedication. I observed the preparations undertaken to receive pilgrims and visitors, with attention not only to effort but to tangible results.
Roads leading to the holy sites, hotels, accommodation, shopping facilities, and essential services were developed to meet the needs of pilgrims performing Hajj and Umrah. Saudi officials and institutions devoted themselves to this continuing mission, making the comfort and safety of worshipers a central priority.
As the kingdom succeeded in meeting these responsibilities, and its international reputation and standing rose, adversaries sought to undermine the prestige it had earned through its organization, hospitality, and commitment to ensuring visitors could return home safely.
I performed Hajj twice. The first time was among senior invited guests, an exceptionally satisfying and enjoyable experience. The second was with friends, when we visited the holy sanctuary and Medina together. We still recall the beauty of that journey.
King Khalid assumed the throne following the death of his half-brother, King Fahd. I have followed the Gulf Cooperation Council closely, including attending its summit meetings alongside King Khalid, who was deeply interested in its details and committed to strengthening its work. I maintained regular contact with his office to communicate developments within the council and secure his support.
King Fahd was a monarch, leader, and initiator who sought to understand the council’s progress in depth. He sometimes advised patience on particular issues, and encouraged collective agreement out of consideration for the circumstances of individual member states. There was no need to rush; what mattered was unity of purpose and firmness of position.
Saudi kings have been statesmen attentive to regional events and global developments, capable of adapting to change, cultivating friendships, and drawing lessons from international affairs. They understood the art of accommodation without haste or unnecessary noise, keeping their doors open to Arabs, Muslims, and others, near and far.
Saudi Arabia’s spirit of brotherhood was demonstrated most powerfully during the catastrophe of Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion and annexation of Kuwait. Saddam had opened the door to his own destruction, and history has recorded both the ugliness of his actions and our failure to adequately recognize the danger his recklessness posed to Kuwait.
Saudi Arabia’s response was unwavering. Under King Fahd’s leadership, the kingdom committed itself fully to Kuwait’s liberation, mobilizing its resources and determination to achieve that goal.
I was close to King Fahd during those painful months. He was always eager to reassure the Kuwaiti community in Riyadh, and repeatedly asked me to tell Kuwaiti citizens that the day of their return was not far away, but that patience was necessary to complete the preparations that would guarantee liberation.
It was a historic moment requiring careful planning and the conviction that the mission would succeed, alongside a willingness to accept whatever sacrifices might be necessary.
Looking back, I recall the decisive Saudi role in launching the liberation effort and securing international support for an extraordinary collective mobilization. We Kuwaitis continue to take pride in Saudi Arabia’s determination to confront aggression and restore our country to its people.
The world witnessed that commitment with admiration, and history records how the Saudi-Kuwaiti partnership demonstrated the full depth of brotherhood between our nations.
We and the generations that follow us will continue to admire the strength of Saudi resolve that opened the path to Kuwait’s liberation. The kingdom will forever remain a steadfast and influential pillar in Kuwait’s history.
– Abdullah Bishara ■
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.